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ABSTRACT
For many years, Chinese infrastructure finance has been secured by African
governments to provide infrastructure of national significance, while cities
continue to lack fiscal tools for the provision of large-scale urban infrastruc-
ture. This article not only demonstrates that Chinese infrastructure finance
is being extended to municipal authorities in Africa to undertake critical
urban infrastructure but also scrutinizes the urban dynamics and local
impact of using Chinese infrastructure finance for urban regeneration.
Through empirical scrutiny of the regeneration of Kotokuraba Market in
Cape Coast, Ghana, findings reveal that municipal authorities, like national
governments, are subjected to political and embedded conditionalities.
However, the conventional resource-backed repayment conditionality char-
acteristic of Chinese-funded national projects differs from the project
finance model—relying on the project’s cash flow for repayment—adopted
in Cape Coast. We found in Cape Coast a locally-driven emphasis on
affordable rents that stands in stark contrast to the practice of project
finance, resulting in potential default of the Chinese loan. The wider con-
sequences of this disjuncture for urban development, financing and gov-
ernance in Cape Coast, Ghana, and Africa are discussed.
Introduction
African countries are generally believed to be confronted with large backlogs of urban infrastructure,
spanning sectors such as commerce, transport, sanitation, housing, water and electricity among many
others (Collier & Venables, 2016; Korah & Cobbinah, 2016; Obeng-Atuah, Poku-Boansi, & Cobbinah,
2017; Obeng-Odoom, 2009; Odoom, 2017), although there are variations among sectors, cities and
countries (Foster & Briceno-Garmendia, 2010). It is argued that “the cost of addressing Africa’s
infrastructure needs is around US$93 billion a year” (Foster & Briceno-Garmendia, 2010, p. 1).
Consequently, Africa ranks at the bottom of all continents in nearly all dimensions of infrastructure
performance (Alves, 2013; World Bank, 2017), prompting African leaders to call on Western and
Chinese development agencies as well as private investors for support in this sphere (Foster,
Butterfield, Chen, & Pushak, 2009). Notably, in many African countries, cities have the largest infra-
structure needs because the number of people living in conurbations has surpassed the number of people
living in rural areas (Collier & Venables, 2016). According to Couch and Fraser (2003), the solution to
Africa’s high urban infrastructural deficit can be found in urban regeneration. It has been emphasized
that investment in infrastructure, through urban regeneration, could become a strategic tool for
economic development and poverty reduction in Africa (World Bank, 2017). Hence, some scholars
argue that Africa should prioritize urban regeneration in its domestic policy, through smart and
innovative solutions (Collier & Venables, 2016), otherwise the continent risks lagging behind other
regions in all aspects of societal advancement. Furthermore, the United Nations requires that “strategic
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public investments [in urban regeneration] must go hand in hand with strategic financial mechanisms
and supporting governance systems” (UN-Habitat, 2015, p. 4).
As a consequence of decentralization, dating as far back as the colonial era, the responsibility for
the provision of key urban services and infrastructure has—theoretically, i.e. legally—been trans-
ferred to municipal authorities (Pachai, 1965; Resnick, 2014). Yet, municipal authorities in Africa,
according to Collier and Venables (2016), have not adequately invested in urban infrastructure due
to inadequate fiscal resources and financing tools. They “face the near-impossible task of funding the
infrastructure and services required to meet the basic needs of their growing urban population, while
forward-looking capital investments are not possible for financial reasons” (UN-Habitat, 2015, p. 4).
Scholarly discussion on municipal financing in Africa suggests that the fundamental problem is not
just inadequate financial resources, but even more so the lack of funding for large-scale urban
infrastructural projects.
Studies show that the majority of municipal authorities in Africa have not been able to take
advantage of emerging forms of large-scale infrastructural financing, such as municipal bonds and
public-private partnerships, because of undeveloped capital markets and lack of necessary regulatory
structures to bolster the confidence of private investors (Akintoye, 2009; Gorelick, 2018; Odoom,
2017; Oji, 2015). Municipal authorities also lack control over their fiscal management, and capacity
to use innovative financing mechanisms (Amirtahmasebi, Orloff, Wahba, & Altman, 2015). It is also
argued that while property taxation is the single largest contributor to the internally-generated funds
of municipal authorities in Africa (Mabe & Kuusaana, 2016; UN-Habitat, 2010), it is characterized by
several shortcomings. Problems such as inadequate logistics to support effective revenue mobiliza-
tion, low rates of tax collection, under-declaring of revenues by revenue collectors, political inter-
ference, and corruption, among many others, have limited the ability of many municipal authorities
in Africa to provide huge urban infrastructure (Adu-Gyamfi, 2014; Fjelstad, Henjewele, Mwambe,
Ngalewa, & Nygaard, 2004; Kelly, 2000; Puopiel & Chimsi, 2015). What is more, property owners
refuse to pay property taxes due to the inability of municipal authorities to provide basic urban
infrastructure and services (Boamah & Okrah, 2016). Consequently, many municipal authorities in
Africa not only perform poorly in respect of property taxation, but are also consistently unable to
meet their revenue targets—thus widening the fiscal gap and increasing demand for urban infra-
structure (Puopiel & Chimsi, 2015; UN-Habitat, 2015).
Due to the poor performance of many municipal authorities in Africa, they have become heavily
dependent on budgetary allocation schemes from their central governments in order to combat the
pernicious effects of serious urban problems across their physical, economic, social and environ-
mental manifestations (Boamah & Okrah, 2016; Kessey, 2001; Leary & McCarthy, 2013; UN-Habitat,
2010). The Western conception of good governance suggests that the reason for poor performance is
rooted in the supposition that most central government budgetary allocation schemes in Africa are
not performance-based, thus discouraging, rather than encouraging, municipal authorities from
generating their own funds for the provision of urban infrastructure (Mogues & Benin, 2012;
Renard, 2011). It is in accordance with this school of thought that we have recently witnessed the
emergence of performance-based grant systems in some African countries. For example, in 2008, the
Government of Ghana in collaboration with its development partners (Canadian Development
Agency, French Development Agency, Danish Development Agency and the German
Development Agency) introduced the District Development Facility (DDF) and, later in 2011, the
World Bank’s Urban Development Grant (UDG), to enhance the capacity of municipal authorities to
finance development projects in the social, economic and environmental sectors (Akudugu, 2013;
Braimah & Inkoom, 2016; Zakaria, 2014). Unlike the traditional schemes, allocation under the DDF
and UDG is determined by performance, after annual assessment of each municipal authority
conducted through the Functional and Organizational Assessment Tool (FOAT). The FOAT consists
of the minimum conditions that municipal authorities must fulfill in order to qualify for the DDF
and UDG (Braimah & Inkoom, 2016; Zakaria, 2013). Nevertheless, it is also instructive to note that
funds from the performance-based DDF and UDG are only able to support the provision of minor
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projects and not the capital-intensive urban infrastructural development that Africa needs. Some
scholars even hold the view that the potential of Western donor support is per se limited, with regard
to the increasing urban infrastructure deficiency in Africa (Chen, 2018; Odoom, 2017).
According to Chen (2018), the growth of Chinese infrastructure finance in Africa came at a time
when the international financial institutions had retreated from financing large-scale infrastructure
because of environmental and social risks, and the global recession had dented Western countries’
capacity for overseas lending as well as the private sector’s appetite for infrastructure investment in
Africa. It is argued that Chinese infrastructural finance, unlike conventional forms of infrastructural
financing, provides the large-scale funding that many African governments continue to search for
(Chen, 2018). Scholars have maintained that China does not interfere in the governance affairs of
borrowing governments as do Western donors and development partners (Asongu & Aminkeng,
2013; Renard, 2011; Sun, 2014). Consequently, many African governments have welcomed China’s
new role as a partner and a source of large-scale infrastructure finance (Odoom, 2017). Although
a review of the literature demonstrates that the usage of Chinese infrastructural finance, such as the
Chinese government concessional loan (CGCL), to (re)develop infrastructure in Africa has been
extensively discussed (Bosshard, 2007; Broadman, 2008; Kitano & Harada, 2016; Renard, 2011), the
focus of previous research has been on Chinese-funded national projects, particularly in the energy,
water, transport and ICT sectors. These studies analyze the nature, processes and conditionalities of
CGCL and situate their research within the framework of China-Africa international relations
(Brautigam, 2011; Corkin, 2011; Mattlin & Nojonen, 2015; Odoom, 2017).
In this study, we contend that Chinese infrastructural finance has received little attention in urban
studies and urban public financing in Africa. Rather, previous studies on municipal financing in
Africa have been overly focused on property taxation and, to some extent, municipal bonds and
public-private partnership (Akintoye, 2009; Gorelick, 2018; Halimi, 2016; Kuusaana, 2015; Li &
Akintoye, 2003; Mabe & Kuusaana, 2016). Therefore, the utilization of Chinese infrastructure
finance at the municipal level, and the consequences thereof for urban development, urban govern-
ance and other forms of municipal financing, are barely scrutinized. Using Cape Coast’s Kotokuraba
Market as a case study, the goal of this article is to explore the urban dynamics and local impact of
using CGCL to finance urban regeneration. The study also examines the fee-fixing process of Cape
Coast and assesses its implications for successful repayment of the CGCL. Based on qualitative
empirical research, this study argues that while municipal authorities are subjected to the same types
of political and embedded conditionalities as are national projects, the project finance repayment
model of municipal projects differs from the resource-backed model of national projects. We will
also learn that, in an attempt by Cape Coast to keep market rents affordable for traders, it has
become evident that the approved rents of spaces in the Kotokuraba market are woefully inadequate
to repay the CGCL. This has enormous implications for future urban development because the
Chinese may be discouraged from providing large-scale infrastructural funding for Cape Coast and
other municipalities in Ghana and Africa, thus exacerbating the infrastructure challenge in the
continent. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 conceptualizes Chinese infra-
structural finance in Africa. In Section 3, we profile the study area. Section 4 presents the research
methods. The findings are presented and discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the study.
Conceptualizing Chinese lending for infrastructural development in Africa
In recent years, there has been a growing body of literature on Chinese involvement in infrastructure
finance in Africa (Alves, 2013; Corkin, 2011; Mattlin & Nojonen, 2015; Odoom, 2016). While it is
generally agreed that China has a unique approach to infrastructural development in Africa, different
voices subscribe to different perspectives (Sun, 2014). On the one hand, the optimists argue that the
growth of Chinese lending in Africa is vital for economic and social development in the continent
because it targets the provision of critical capital intensive infrastructure that has been neglected by
Western development partners and bilateral donors for several decades (Alves, 2013; Asongu &
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Aminkeng, 2013; Moss & Rose, 2006; Renard, 2011). On the other hand, the pessimists conceptualize
China “as a twenty-first century neo(colonial) power that is plundering Africa’s natural resources
while corrupt, or at best passive, African leaders fuel the metaphorical dragon” (Odoom, 2016, p. ii).
The balanced perspective contends that China’s engagement with Africa is shaped by an economic
complementarity between manufacturing giant China, endowed with infrastructure construction
firms but with little natural resources, and a resource-rich but financially poor Africa, with a huge
infrastructural challenge (Alves, 2013; Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013; Odoom, 2016, 2017). The Chinese
government concessional loan (CGCL) is one of the funding schemes through which this comple-
mentary relationship has been strengthened over the years. The CGCL is a “medium- and long-term,
low interest credit … designed to fund manufacturing projects, infrastructure construction projects,
social welfare projects in the borrowing country, which can generate promising economic returns or
good social benefits” (Corkin, 2011, p. 69). Between 2009 and 2012, China committed to Africa an
amount of US$10 billion in concessional loans (Brautigam, 2011). During this period, Ghana was the
largest recipient of Chinese infrastructure financing in Africa (Gutman, Sy, & Chattopadhyay, 2015).
While a chunk of these funds was directed at national infrastructural projects, the city of Cape Coast
was one (if not the only) of the municipal authorities in Ghana that benefited directly from this loan.
It is often argued that Chinese lending does not come with the political, human rights, environ-
mental and performance-based conditions characteristic of Western-originated or partnered agency
financing (Moss & Rose, 2006; Tull, 2006). Nevertheless, recent research by Mattlin and Nojonen
(2015) has revealed that Chinese lending is not necessarily condition-free but rather comprises
conditions that are different in character from those of the Western development agencies.
Particularly, they note three conditionalities—political, embedded and repayment—for accessing
a CGCL. Firstly, the borrowing country must subscribe to the political condition of the One-
China principle, which is a diplomatic acknowledgement that there is only one Chinese government
and that Taiwan is part of China and not a sovereign state (Renard, 2011; Sun, 2014). As indicated by
Mattlin and Nojonen (2015, p. 707), “for African countries with diplomatic ties with China,
[financial support for infrastructural development] has been almost automatic”. Secondly, certain
project-related demands are embedded in the loan agreement. For instance, only larger infrastruc-
ture projects (minimum size of US$2.4 million) that involve considerable use of Chinese goods (at
least 50%) and technology, equipment, materials and services (using Chinese construction firms as
contractors) may be funded with a CGCL (Brautigam, 2011; Odoom, 2017). This privileged access to
infrastructure contracts in concessional loan agreements has fuelled the entry of a large number of
Chinese construction firms into Africa and other regions in the Global South (Alves, 2013; Burke,
2007). Recent statistics show that the Chinese construction industry grew at an average of 22%
between 2008 and 2013 and is estimated to account for a fifth of the global construction industry by
2020 (Alves, 2013). Lastly, Mattlin and Nojonen (2015) argue that Chinese infrastructure finance is
driven more by business considerations than by a purposeful effort to restructure the economy of the
recipient countries. Consequently, China has an interest in ensuring repayment of principal and
accrued interest on loans, and one way of ensuring this is by backing it with either the proceeds of
the recipient country’s main export commodity or the resource itself; a practice which has been
conceptualized by scholars as infrastructure-for-resource (Chan-Fishel & Lawson, 2007; Odoom,
2017). In other words, China offers the provision of the needed infrastructure in exchange for access
to the natural resources it needs to promote its development (Alves, 2013). For instance, the Chinese
loans that were advanced for the construction of Ghana’s Bui Dam project in 2007 and the Atuabo
Gas Pipeline project in 2014 were guaranteed repayment through export sales of cocoa beans and oil
respectively to Chinese firms (Brautigam, 2011; Odoom, 2017). Many of such infrastructure-for-
resource loans can be found across the continent, especially in Nigeria, Congo, Angola, Sudan and
Zambia among others (van Dijk, 2009).
However, Asongu and Aminkeng (2013) have argued that there is little evidence to suggest that
Chinese infrastructural finance is directed only at countries with major natural resources. For instance,
Chinese investment in infrastructure in Rwanda continues to increase, although this African country,
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landlocked and with few natural resources, does not fit the conventional narrative of Chinese interest in
Africa (Kuo, 2016). Where a recipient country has few natural resources to offer in exchange for
infrastructure, evidence from elsewhere (Sri Lanka) suggests that project finance may be an alternative
repaymentmodel in Chinese infrastructure finance (Abi-Habib, 2018). Fabozzi and de Nahlik (2012) and
Khan and Parra (2003) have defined project finance as financing of a specific infrastructural project in
which the lender is satisfied with the cash flows and earnings of that particular project as the source of
funds from which a loan is to be repaid. Hence, the specific project serves as collateral for the loan. In
other words, project finance involves servicing and redeeming the cost of a project exclusively from its
proceeds or cash flow (Finnerty, 2007; Gatti, 2008). It is argued that, in project finance, the borrower
must convince the lender that the project is economically viable, implying that it has the ability to
generate sufficient cash flows to fund operating costs and service the amount invested (Finnerty, 2007;
Gatti, 2008). While the lender may be satisfied that a specific infrastructure is viable, they may also
require some direct or indirect guarantees by third parties who are motivated to do so (Fabozzi & de
Nahlik, 2012). Where an infrastructural project is economically weak to the extent that it is unable to
service operating costs and debt, scholars have cautioned that project finance may be a very risky venture
(Finnerty, 2007; Khan & Parra, 2003).
We glean some insights from the adoption of project finance in a Chinese loan secured by Sri Lanka
for the development of the deep-sea Hambantota Port. Although feasibility studies indicated that the port
was not viable because the proposed location was not in proximity to an industrial hub, the Sri Lankan
government went ahead to secure a Chinese loan to finance the project with an agreement to repay the
loan from the proceeds of the new port (Abi-Habib, 2018). Upon completion in 2012, the state struggled
to repay the loan, as the new port drew few ships. Because, in project finance, the infrastructure serves as
collateral for the loan, the lender may take over the infrastructure and any other strategic asset once the
borrower defaults the repayment of the loan. Consequently, under intense pressure from China, Sri
Lanka was compelled to surrender its new port and 15,000 acres of land to China on a 99-year lease
agreement (Abi-Habib, 2018). Crucially, the Sri Lankan case also raises some pertinent questions about
the quality of governance in countries that China offers concessional loans for infrastructural develop-
ment. In Africa particularly, China has been criticized by the West for providing large-scale infrastruc-
tural finance to countries with weak or undemocratic governance, who may therefore have difficulties
repaying their loans (Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013; Renard, 2011). In the Western conception, these
countries have low credit ratings, which is why they face tremendous difficulties securing large-scale
funding from the international financial markets and private investors (Sun, 2014). While China
certainly cannot be blamed per se for assisting countries with poor governance, the question of taking
advantage of this weakness arises. At the least, studies have argued that reaping the full benefits of
Chinese infrastructural finance would require significant improvement in governance in African coun-
tries (Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013; Renard, 2011).
It must, however, be noted that the existing scientific scrutiny and knowledge of Chinese funding
of infrastructural development in Africa and other developing countries has largely focused on
national projects (Brautigam, 2009; Corkin, 2011; Odoom, 2017). For the urban realm, a huge
desideratum exists: it is hard to come by an empirical study that analyzes a Chinese infrastructural
funding or a CGCL secured by central government for the direct use of a municipal authority.
Therefore, this paper aims to contribute to the discussion of urban infrastructural financing and
Chinese infrastructure finance in Africa by revealing how the city authority in Cape Coast has been
drawn into and creatively applied the national infrastructural financing strategy. Moreover, there is
little understanding of the urban dynamics and consequences of using the CGCL to finance urban
regeneration in Africa. We shed light on the repayment model of Chinese-funded municipal projects
and the possible reason(s) for its adoption. Through Chinese infrastructural financing, we are able to
understand the implication of municipal borrowing in a country like Ghana which does not have
a previous history of municipal borrowing.
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Study area
Recent studies have shown that the activities of the Chinese in Ghana are prevalent in its capital, Accra,
where they are involved in trade and construction, and in the rural areas, where they participate in gold
mining (Amoah, 2014; Hilson, Hilson, & Adu-Darko, 2014; Odoom, 2016). Therefore, these locations
have become the conventional sites for research on Chinese activities in Ghana. The selection of Cape
Coast—a city where Chinese activities had previously been virtually non-existent—to understand the
urban dimension of Chinese infrastructure finance is novel and brings a different perspective to the
growing literature on Ghana-China relations. Cape Coast was founded during the 13th to 14th centuries
(Hyland, 1995) and thus, has a history of more than 600 years (Agyei-Mensah, 2006). When the
Portuguese arrived at the coast of Ghana (then known as the Gold Coast) in 1471, Cape Coast was an
important trading center along the coast of West Africa (Agyei-Mensah & Ardayafio-Schandorf, 2007).
During the years of its colonization by the British, the city grew to become the first colonial capital of the
then crown colony “Gold Coast." Consequently, Cape Coast enjoyed a period of relative economic and
social prosperity during the greater part of the colonial period. Nevertheless, it suffered a serious and
irreversible decline in importance after the capital was relocated to Accra in 1877, and modern harbours
were built in Takoradi and Tema (Agyei-Mensah, 2006; Hyland, 1995). From a capital city in the colonial
period, Cape Coast is now arguably a minor secondary city in Ghana. Currently, it occupies an area of
122 square kilometers, and accommodates a population of 169,894 (Ghana Statistical Service, 2013). It
doubles as the capital of the Central Region of Ghana, which is considered as the tourism hub of the
country and the seat of the Cape Coast Metropolitan Assembly (CCMA) (Adu-Ampong, 2017).
During the early 1940s, the British colonial authorities, with the help of the local people,
constructed the new triangular-shaped Kotokuraba market (Figure 1 shows the location of
Kotokuraba Market in CCMA). Upon completion, the British handed over ownership and manage-
ment of the market to the Cape Coast Town Council, as it was then known. According to Nyomi and
Armah (2014), the market was built to serve as a place where the colonial rulers and their men could
purchase their provisions, but was also an important outlet for the farmers, fishermen and other
traders to sell what they had to locals and foreigners. During the early years of its development, the
number of stores in the market outnumbered the trader population. By the early 1970s, the scramble
for stall allocation led to the spread of trading activities from Kotokuraba Market to an adjoining
piece of land, which had lain relatively unused since the market was completed in the colonial
period. The adjoining market space, mainly occupied by petty traders, soon became known as
Kotoka Market. Transport operators also secured two spaces around the market, one known as
the Mankessim Station and the other the Edina Station.
By the 2000s, the trader population in Kotokuraba Market had outgrown the number of stores.
Consequently, the markets—Kotokuraba and Kotoka—became congested, with trading activities
spilling off onto the streets. There were numerous problems, from sanitation and refuse collection
to hygiene standards and food safety (Nyomi & Armah, 2014). When it rained, many of the roofs
leaked profusely. Plans to regenerate the market have been in the pipeline since the 1990s, but lack of
funds was the greatest recurrent obstacle. It was only in 2012 that the CCMA, with the assistance of
central government, was finally able to secure funding through CGCL for the regeneration of the
market. Kotokuraba Market is important to the economy of Cape Coast because it employs the
majority of the city’s active workforce. This is supported by recent statistics from the Ghana
Statistical Service (2013) which indicate that the wholesale and retail industry is the largest in
Cape Coast, engaging over 25% of the employed population. See Figure 2 for images of the
Kotokuraba market before and after construction.
Methods
This study was conducted over two periods: March to May 2017 and March to July 2018. It adopted
a qualitative research design. In line with this research design, a case study strategy was particularly
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important in order to gain a detailed understanding of the context of this research. The choice of the
Kotokuraba Market project was informed by the fact that CCMA adopted an unconventional
financing scheme (in terms of past projects in Cape Coast) to fund the market project. Data was
gathered from both primary and secondary sources. For the primary data, purposive and snowball
sampling techniques were adopted in selecting the study participants. The purposive sampling
technique was used to select five local government bureaucrats, eight local assembly members, and
one traditional ruler. Snowball sampling was employed in selecting the 52 traders and 12 market
leaders at Kotokuraba Market. In a market of over 1,500 traders, a snowball sampling technique is
probably the most powerful tool to recruit potential respondents (see Morris, 2015). At a total of 78
in-depth interviews, data saturation was reached, as additional data provided little or no new insight
(Morris, 2015; Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2009). Approval from gatekeepers (Morris, 2015) such
as the Mayor of Cape Coast as well as market queens and leaders in the market was highly helpful in
having access to all the respondents for the study.
Figure 1. Map of Kotokuraba Market in CCMA.
Source: Authors’ Construct and Google Maps, 2018
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All interviews were audiotaped. While interviews with the officials were conducted in English, the
traders and their leaders preferred to be interviewed in Fante, the local Akan dialect in Cape Coast.
The researchers transcribed all the interviews. A thematic approach was employed in analyzing the
data (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 2016). We adopted the five-stage process of Morris (2015) in
analyzing the transcripts. Stage 1 involved a careful read-through and note-taking. In stage 2, we
took note of important or striking quotes. This was followed by coding/finding themes in stage 3. In
stage 4, we selected the themes to focus on during the write-up. The last stage involved interpreting
and writing up the interview material under the selected themes. In addition to the primary data,
secondary data were also gathered from parliamentary Hansard, court rulings, newspaper articles,
committee reports and archival materials. This was necessary to ensure both methodological and
data source triangulation, and to ensure that validity of data went beyond the simple repetitive action
of gathering data (Yin, 2011).
Findings and discussion
Municipal finance and the utilization of Chinese government concessional loan in Cape Coast
Cape Coast, by virtue of decentralization, has been the capital of the Cape Coast Metropolitan
Assembly (CCMA) since its creation in the late 1980s. Due to the historic attraction of the city,
public and private investments in Cape Coast focused on tourism development at the expense of
other economic sectors (Adu-Ampong, 2017; Agyei-Mensah, 2006). Therefore, many years of neglect
resulted in poor infrastructure across the urban landscape of Cape Coast. Like many Ghanaian and
African cities, Cape Coast struggled to meet its revenue target (see Table 1; Puopiel & Chimsi, 2015)
and thus lacked the financial muscle to independently undertake large-scale urban regeneration
projects. Cape Coast has been a beneficiary of the District Development Facility (DDF) and Urban
Development Grant (UDG) since the inception of the two schemes, but these awards have been for
development of small social projects in the metropolis. According to a bureaucrat respondent, “we
Kotokuraba Market before regeneration
Photography by Kojo Mbeah
Kotokuraba Market after regeneration
Photography by Lewis Abedi Asante
Figure 2. Images of the Kotokuraba Market before and after the regeneration.
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applied the UDG to redevelop the relatively small Abura market because we felt it was dilapidated …
but the UDG is not enough to redevelop a big market like Kotokuraba” (interview, March 15, 2017).
Efforts by successive municipal governments in Cape Coast to redevelop the market failed largely
due to lack of large-scale infrastructural financing. Consequently, Cape Coast continued to experi-
ence a slow pace in infrastructural and economic development, compared to the likes of Accra and
Kumasi. In 2010, the city mayor established a private limited liability company—Cape Coast
Development Company—to attract external funding and engage in joint venture investments to
ensure a holistic development of Cape Coast. One of the target projects of the company was
Kotokuraba Market. However, the company, on its own, struggled to attract any significant private
sector funding for the redevelopment of the market.
In the lead-up to the 2008 general elections in Ghana, Professor John Evans Atta-Mills, the
presidential aspirant on the ticket of the National Democratic Congress and an indigene of Cape
Coast promised Cape Coasters, during his campaign tour, that he was going to ensure the redeve-
lopment of Kotokuraba Market if he became the next president of Ghana. In Ghana, it is character-
istic of presidential candidates to promise the electorate development of specific infrastructure
during election campaigns (Obeng-Odoom, 2010a). Fortunately, this particular promise became
a reality, as Professor Atta-Mills won the election and assumed power on January 7, 2009.
Immediately, together with his Mayor appointee in Cape Coast, he initiated arrangements to fulfill
his promise to the people of Cape Coast. Once the president had engaged a couple of development
partners, the Chinese government agreed to provide a concessional loan for the construction of
a new Kotokuraba market. The Western development partners may have been unwilling to fund the
redevelopment of Kotokuraba Market because they were already involved in budgetary support for
urban authorities in Ghana under the DDF and UDG. However, the Chinese stepped in as the lender
of last resort to enable Cape Coast provide a large-scale market infrastructure to the benefit of its
urban population (Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013; Odoom, 2017).
The Government of Ghana (GoG), represented by the Ministry of Finance, had to be the primary
borrower of the loan because, at the time, city authorities in Ghana could only undertake external
borrowing of US$426.22,1 an amount “so low that it can be said that there is virtually no municipal loan
in Ghana” (Kuusi, 2009, p. 240). There was also no precedent of any municipal authority using a Chinese
government concessional loan (CGCL) to (re)develop infrastructure. In accordance with the procedure for
accessing CGCL, the GoG, upon the recommendation of the resident Chinese Economic Counsellor,
submitted a formal application to the Exim Bank of China for consideration (Corkin, 2011; Hubbard,
2007). In the application, the GoG requested US$200 million for the redevelopment of a modern
Kotokuraba Market complex, constituting five market buildings, Sectors A to E, accommodating stores,
stalls, supermarkets and other complementary facilities such as restaurant, clinic, offices, banking hall,
bathroom and toilet facilities, underground storage and a car park for traders and shoppers. As is typical in
project finance, a feasibility report was submitted to the Chinese for assessment (Fabozzi & deNahlik, 2012;
Khan & Parra, 2003). The report’s assessment passed the project as being economically viable. The officials
of the Exim Bank of China approved the loan application, but recommended that the GoG be given only
US$30 million, instead of the US$200 million requested. This indicates that China does not necessarily
provide the full loan amount requested by borrower countries. A local politician, in an interview,
commented that
Table 1. Estimated IGF performance of Cape Coast Metropolitan Assembly, 2013–2017.
Amount in (US$)













Shortfall 19,200 45,431 29,219 51,997 77,483
Source: CCMA, 2018
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The Chinese officials did not give any specific reason why they offered us an amount below what we requested.
We had to take a decision immediately. Eventually, we accepted the offer … We had to remove Sectors C,
D and E as well as the underground storage from the proposed design. (Interview, April 12, 2018)
With only about 15% (US$30 million) of the expected funding approved, CCMA decided to
construct only sectors A and B,2 instead of the original A to E, and a car park. Having accepted the
offer, the GoG and the Exim Bank of China, on 18 July 2012, entered a concessional loan agreement
for an amount of US$30 million for the financing of Kotokuraba Market on terms and conditions set
forth in the credit agreement. As a condition precedent to the release of the first tranche of the
concessional loan, the GoG and the direct user of the loan, the CCMA entered into a subsidiary
agreement on January 24, 2013, to on-lend the credit facility to the city authority in accordance with
the credit agreement. The loan attracts a fixed rate of interest of 2% per annum. According to the
subsidiary agreement, CCMA shall repay to the GoG the disbursed principal amount of the credit in
semi-annual installments commencing on the first payment date in 2017 and ending on the last date
of payment in 2042. CCMA shall for the purpose of the project open and maintain a special account
at the Bank of Ghana on terms and conditions satisfactory to the GoG. The CCMA and the GoG
shall be signatories to the account. Notably, unlike other Chinese-funded national projects in Ghana
and other African countries where the country’s main commodity export was used to pay back the
loan (Odoom, 2017), in the case of Cape Coast, the loan is to be repaid through project finance, that
is, from the proceeds generated from the operation of the new Kotokuraba Market. This is similar to
the case of Sri Lanka, where project finance was agreed as the repayment method for a loan taken to
develop a harbor (Abi-Habib, 2018). In Africa, the project financing repayment model has not been
adequately reported in extant scholarly literature (see Brautigam, 2011; Corkin, 2011; Odoom, 2017)
because most studies have analyzed national projects in resource-rich countries. Several reasons may
have accounted for the adoption of project financing in Cape Coast. Firstly, by consistently qualify-
ing for the DDF and UDG, Cape Coast proved to be one of the high-performing municipalities in
Ghana and therefore had the credibility to repay a loan. Secondly, the Kotokuraba Market project
happened at a time when the CCMA (through its creation of the Cape Coast Development
Company) and GoG had intensified the drive for public-private partnership and therefore securing
private funds through CGCL for urban infrastructural development was in line with this ideology.
Lastly, natural resources in most African countries, Ghana inclusive, are constitutionally declared
national assets and may be used to guarantee projects of national significance and not municipal
projects.
As is characteristic of Chinese infrastructure finance, the Chinese officials insisted on some
project-related demands, as previously captured in the works of Mattlin and Nojonen (2015),
Brautigam (2011) and Corkin (2011). Of course, Ghana’s continued adherence to the political
condition of the One-China policy (Tsikata, Fenny, & Aryeetey, 2008) was the reason why the
CGCL was approved in the first place. The construction of the new market was undertaken by
a Chinese construction firm, China Railway Construction and Engineering Group Limited (Alves,
2013). Furthermore, in order to avert any negative social impact, officials of the Exim Bank of China
emphasized that part of the loan should be used to construct temporary markets for the traders. It
must be noted that proceeds from these temporary markets counted towards repayment of the loan.
The fibre-made building material (see Figure 3) that was used in constructing the temporary markets
was shipped from China and assembled in Cape Coast. During the first few months of the relocation,
the traders complained that the constructional material had poor insulation qualities which resulted
in high temperatures in the market and in the destruction of several perishable and canned items.
The bureaucrats and local politicians, however, downplayed these concerns of the traders. In
addition, more than 50% of the constructional materials that were used for construction of the
new market were imported from China (Mattlin & Nojonen, 2015).
Furthermore, the Exim Bank of China officials also wanted the Chinese construction firm to
take up all pre-contract services (that is, the architectural and engineering drawings), because
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projects financed with CGCL are characteristically turnkey (Chaponniere, 2009). However, this
led to formidable problems because the CCMA had already signed a contract with Design
Associates, a Ghanaian firm, engaging them as the engineering/architectural consultant to under-
take both the pre- and post-contract services for the Kotokuraba Market project. Design
Associates, from its own resources, had subsequently provided CCMA with designs and
a model structure of the new market and reports (feasibility and Environmental Impact
Assessment) that were attached to the application for the loan. As a counter to the request by
the Chinese, a local politician remarked that
I kicked against it when I met them [the Exim Bank of China officials] … By that time, Design Associates had
done the designs. I had to find a technical way of stopping them. I told them that if you bring your drawings to
Ghana, it would not be approved because your architects and engineers are not registered in Ghana. For this
reason, we have already commissioned a Ghanaian firm to do that work. So you have to find a way of working
with the firm. In a way, I managed to get them off. So the pre-contract services were to be paid out of the US
$30 million. (Interview, 12 April 2018)
Although the officials of the Exim Bank of China agreed, they were unhappy that the pre-contract
services were to be conducted by a Ghanaian firm. This was clearly evident in their subsequent
action. A local politician commented that
When we came back from China and the project was about to start, the Chinese sent a team to Ghana
specifically to inform us that we could not pay the post-contract services with their money … The post-contract
services are the normal engineering supervision, quantity surveying and all the services you render after the
construction takes off … I briefed the executive committee of CCMA about the new development. I made
a suggestion that we will do supervision for free. I am a civil engineer by profession. We had to form a technical
team to provide the post-contract services throughout the project. (Interview, 12 April 2008)
By implication, if a Chinese firm could not undertake the pre-contract services, then a CGCL could
not be used to pay the same Ghanaian firm to undertake the post-contract services. The Chinese
construction firm which was expected to pay Design Associates for the pre-contract services refused
to do so. On December 20, 2015, Design Associates sued the GoG, CCMA and the Chinese
construction firm in the Cape Coast High Court for delaying payment for the pre-contract services
and for failing to involve it in the day-to-day construction of the new market, although its contract
with CCMA had not been formally terminated. In their statement of claim, Design Associates sought
a total amount of US$10,380,000, about a third of the project cost, for costs incurred for site
investigation, feasibility studies, environmental impact assessment, a model structure, professional
fees for producing technical drawings, loss of profit and breach of copyright. Although the case is
still pending in court, a local politician elucidated:
Figure 3. A section of the temporary markets in Cape Coast.
Photography by Lewis Abedi Asante
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The Chinese are not being truthful to Design Associates … Me, when they were negotiating I was in the room.
I sat there as an observer. I did not contribute. But I remember they agreed on a figure. Now, the Chinese
[contractor] is saying that the drawings were not complete. I asked them [Chinese contractor] if they wrote to
Design Associates to inform them about it. They [Chinese contractor] said they did but did not receive a reply
so they went ahead to engage the services of another firm. We tried to convince them to pay Design Associates
but things did not work out. (Interview, 12 April 2018)
One could question why the Chinese construction firm advanced the claim that the drawings were
incomplete, when the same drawings were submitted as part of the application for the loan. Was it
merely a strategy to eliminate Design Associates from the scene? Lastly, while the CCMA officials
decided to discontinue plans for the car park after the money was reduced, the Exim Bank of China
officials insisted that a car park must be part of the project because, in China, a car park fetches more
revenue for municipal authorities than do market stores. Consistent with the literature (e.g
Brautigam, 2011; Corkin, 2011; Odoom, 2017), the Cape Coast study shows that using CGCL for
infrastructure development can be very demanding on recipient countries and municipalities.
Therefore, countries that choose to use CGCL to finance urban regeneration may have to brace
themselves for a turnkey project, as China is unwilling to let go any major aspects of projects to local
firms of the recipient countries, as evident in the Cape Coast study. In the next section, we shed light
on how CCMA determined the rents of spaces in the new market in their quest to repay the CGCL.
Determination of rents of market spaces in Kotokuraba Market
As earlier indicated, Cape Coast adopted project finance by accepting to repay its Chinese loan from
the proceeds of the market infrastructure for which it secured the funds (Fabozzi & de Nahlik, 2012;
Khan & Parra, 2003). Therefore, this section offers an understanding of how the municipality in
Cape Coast determined rents of spaces in the new market infrastructure. By April 2017, sectors A,
B and C of the Kotokuraba Market project had been completed. There had been a change of
government in January 2017 from the National Democratic Congress (NDC) to the New Patriotic
Party (NPP). The Cape Coast Metropolitan Assembly (CCMA), under the administration of the
NPP, initiated the process of determining the rents of the market spaces. This was particularly
necessary because CCMA had signed an agreement to pay back the full amount of the Chinese
government concessional loan (CGCL), starting in 2017. The determination of the rents had to go
through the fee-fixing processes (see Figure 4) and guidelines of the Ministry of Local Government
Bureaucrats proposed fees
Stakeholder discussion on proposed fees
Consideration by Finance and Administration
Sub-committee
Consideration by Executive Committee
Approval of fees by General Assembly
Figure 4. The process of determining fees in MMDAs in Ghana.
Source: Authors’ Construct
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and Rural Development (MLGRD). According to the most recent guidelines, the basis for determin-
ing charges are, among others, the purpose the amount will serve, the capacity of the population to
pay, competing rents prevailing in the open market, strategic location of the facility and level of
economic activities in the area (MLGRD, 2017).
As seen in Table 2, the fee-fixing processes began with the bureaucrats proposing rents for the
various market and other commercial spaces. In accordance with the guidelines of MLGRD, the
proposed rents were based on open market rents and the ability of the population to pay. This is
reflected in the remarks of one bureaucrat:
There are some things that … informed the setting of the rents. One of the things we did was to check the rent
of stores of traders who sell around the market. They are private properties, which are being rented out to these
traders. How much do they pay? Then we had to crosscheck with the rent of stores in Kaneshie Market [in
Accra], then we also crosschecked with Asafo Market in Kumasi … We did evaluation of the bits and pieces we
picked from other places and in Cape Coast … When we came out with the list [of proposed rents], … we did
not think it was realistic, having regard to the amount of the loan … Yet, we thought they were reasonable
rates. (Interview, 11 April 2018)
We probed further to find out from the same bureaucrat why the loan was not the main determinant
for the fixing of rents. He commented that
If we had taken it [the loan] into account, it would have been very difficult for anybody to operate in that
market. Very difficult! So we … had to put that one [the loan] aside and look at the prevailing circumstances
around. That was what we did. If we had determined the rent strictly in accordance with the loan, that [market]
facility would become a white elephant here in Cape Coast. (Interview, 11 April 2018)
At this point, one question that came to mind was why there was an emphasis on affordability for
a project that was funded with a loan, payable within a certain timeframe. More crucially, we wondered
whether the CCMA would be able to repay the loan. We will explore this in the next section.
After the bureaucrats had fixed the proposed rents, they invited all relevant stakeholders to a meeting
to deliberate on them. The displaced traders were present at this meeting. They requested a reduction in
the proposed rents on the basis that they were too high, considering the low profit they made on their
market sales. Indeed, for traders who were used to paying US$2.77 for a lockable store and US$0.64 for
a stall in the old market and US$2.56 and US$4.26 for standard and big stores respectively in the
temporary markets, the amount presented by the bureaucrats (see Table 2) would obviously seem too
high. Nonetheless, the traders were eventually convinced by the bureaucrats to accept the proposed rents.
The expectation of the bureaucrats was that these rents would be maintained throughout the next stages
of the fee-fixing processes. However, it turned out not to be the case.
Table 2. Kotokuraba Market rents at various stages of the fee-fixing processes of CCMA.
(Monthly rent in US Dollars)
Bureaucrats F & A* Sub-Committee Executive Committee General Assembly % Reduction
Trading spaces
Stores (Maxi) 31.97 25.57 25.57 21.31 (150) ** 33
Stores (Mini) 21.31 17.05 17.05 14.92 (120) 30
Supermarket 106.56 106.56 106.56 85.24 (2) 20
Mini supermarket 63.93 63.93 63.93 42.62 (28) 33
Stalls 3.02 2.56 2.56 2.56 (490) 20
Other spaces
Office Accommodation 21.31 21.31 21.31 21.31 (14) 0
Restaurant 319.67 170.49 170.49 170.49 (1) 47
Clinic 127.87 127.87 127.87 127.87 (1) 0
Banking Hall 639.33 639.33 639.33 639.33 (2) 0
Car Parks 852.44 852.44 852.44 852.44 (1) 0
Bath & Toilet Facilities 319.67 319.67 319.67 319.67 (1) 0
Source: CCMA, 2018
*F & A means Finance and Administration
** Figures in brackets show the number of spaces of the corresponding facility
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Upon completion of the stakeholder engagements, the bureaucrats forwarded the agreed rents to
the Finance & Administration sub-committee (comprised mainly of local politicians) of the CCMA
for further consideration. The traders lobbied the sub-committee to get the rents reduced, but were
unsuccessful because discussion on the rents had been concluded and passed onto the next stage. As
seen in Table 2, the sub-committee made some reductions in the rents of the trading spaces while
leaving those of the other commercial spaces unchanged. Like the bureaucrats, the local politicians
adopted the bases, open market rents, the level of economic activities in Cape Coast and most
importantly the ability of the population to pay, conforming to the guidelines of MLGRD (2017).
When the sub-committee finished its work, it forwarded its recommended fees to the Executive
Committee of CCMA. The Executive Committee did not alter the recommendations of the Finance
and Administration sub-committee, as evident in Table 2. The Executive Committee, after delibera-
tion, submitted it to the General Assembly for final approval. The General Assembly is the final
decision-making body on all matters of municipal authorities in Ghana and decides on matters by
votes of the majority of Assembly members present and voting. The General Assembly was the final
stage for the traders to get a reduction. According to a leader of the traders,
Because we were not successful in previous attempts, we then decided to forward our request to the general
assembly because it is the highest decision-making body in the assembly. So, on the day the General Assembly
met, I stood up and I said a lot of things about our low profit margin and the current economic situation … So
they realized what I said was reasonable and they reduced the rents for us. (Interview, 2 April 2018)
We see in Table 2 that the General Assembly, led by the mayor, succumbed to the plea of the traders
and reduced, further, the rents of the trading spaces. Making rents affordable for the traders was the
main reason indicated by a senior local politician who was part of the General Assembly proceed-
ings. Notwithstanding the nature of repayment financing, we observed a conscious effort by the
bureaucrats and politicians alike to ensure that the market rents were not exorbitant for the traders.
This situation raised some concern because the nature of project finance requires that the cost of
infrastructural projects are repaid exclusively from their proceeds (Fabozzi & de Nahlik, 2012; Gatti,
2008). Therefore, it was expected that the rents should have been based on the amount of loan
invested in redeveloping Kotokuraba Market and not strictly in accordance with the guidelines of
MLGRD. It can be concluded that the officials clearly prioritized the social objective of the project
over the market-oriented practice of project finance (Finnerty, 2007; Gatti, 2008). There are at least
two possible reasons for this. First, the newly-appointed politicians wanted to avoid the social unrest
that might have arisen from the setting of high rents. Second, they used low rents as an economic
instrument to win the support of the traders, which is an indication of the short-term political gains
that politicians often pursue.
(In)ability to repay the Chinese loan
Based on the foregoing discussion, one critical issue—the ability of Cape Coast Metropolitan
Assembly (CCMA) to pay back the Chinese government concession loan (CGCL)—featured strongly
in our interviews. When we enquired about the ability or otherwise of CCMA to repay the loan, the
bureaucrats were quick to reply that the current approved rents present a very disturbing picture
because the rents have been reduced to levels that make repayment within 25 years virtually
impossible. By our informal calculations, if CCMA borrowed US$30 million for 25 years at an
interest rate of two percent and repayment is on semi-annual basis, then per the ordinary annuity
formula,3 an estimated periodic payment of US$765,306.12 is expected to be made by CCMA every
six months for 25 years. Based on our assessment of the approved rents in Table 2, the new market
will fetch an estimated monthly revenue of US$10,654.61. This translates into a semi-annual revenue
of US$63,927.66, representing a paltry eight percent of the periodic semi-annual payments on the
CGCL. From the perspective of project finance, this analysis shows that Kotokuraba Market is
unable to generate enough funds to cover operation costs and service the CGCL (Finnerty, 2007;
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Gatti, 2008). According to the bureaucrats, the CCMA finds itself in this position because it has
excluded them (bureaucrats) from the three final and crucial stages of the fee-fixing processes. They
expressed deep frustration by saying that they are unable to take independent professional decisions
in the interest of the municipal authority without interference from the local politicians. A previous
study by Yeboah and Obeng-Odoom (2010) has shown that bureaucrats in municipal authorities feel
powerless working with a group of people whose decisions, they believe, are politically motivated and
not based on financial considerations.
However, the local politicians argue that they cannot be blamed for reducing the rents to the
levels that reflect the socioeconomic situation in Cape Coast, as required by the guidelines of
MLGRD (2017). Rather, the NPP-led administration at the CCMA indicate that if the municipal
authority cannot repay the loan within the stipulated period, then questions should be asked about
the credibility of the feasibility study that was submitted by the NDC administration to the Exim
Bank of China during the loan application. These NPP politicians are convinced that the feasibility
study did not carefully consider the location of the market and the potential occupants in determin-
ing the economic viability of the project. We observed a deliberate attempt by the NPP administra-
tion to put the blame at the doorstep of the previous NDC. While the new administration cannot
deny some responsibility for the situation in Cape Coast, it can, perhaps, be concluded that the
NDC-led CCMA may have realized the project was not viable but their quest to fulfill a political
promise may have pushed them to adjust figures in the feasibility study in order to lay hands on
funds for the project.4 This conclusion is consistent with the case of Sri Lanka, where even though
feasibility reports showed the project was not viable, the state still went ahead to secure the loan to
implement the project, and eventually struggled to repay it (Abi-Habib, 2018). But of course, in
Europe or North America as well, practices of campaign pledging and deficit financing are wide-
spread and often lead subsequently to massive debates on the relationship between partisan politics,
political responsibility, and public debt.
Aside the issues of low rents and poor feasibility reports, another major reason why CCMA may
not be able to repay the loan is that the proceeds from the temporary markets have been poorly
managed. As indicated earlier, the funds used in constructing the temporary markets are part of the
loan facility. Therefore, the revenues generated from the temporary markets should have been kept
in a separate interest-yielding account. However, it was found that monies generated from the
temporary markets were put into the common revenue basket and used to cover recurrent expen-
diture such as fuel, allowance and per diem for assembly members and bureaucrats. Furthermore, as
of July 2018, by which time the new market had been in operation for almost one year, the escrow
account, into which the rents collected are to be deposited had not been created. The bureaucrats
indicated that the process of creating the account would start “soon." This is a cause for concern
because repayments should have started in 2017.
When we probed further to discover what measures CCMA was putting in place to avoid
default of CGCL installment payments, there was a general consensus among bureaucrats and
politicians alike that the central government should be alerted that it might have to pay the loan
on behalf of CCMA. According to one of the local politicians, “in fact, if the central government
does not come in, the Chinese would have to come and take over the market” (Interview,
3 April 2018). This indicates that the repayment challenge of Chinese loans is not necessarily
a problem only in African countries with weak or undemocratic governance, but also in countries
(e.g. Ghana) that are perceived to have a relatively high level of governance on the continent.
Notwithstanding the problem at hand, the respondents agreed that developing infrastructure with
CGCL is a sustainable approach to development if proper and detailed feasibility study precedes
the loan application. However, others were of the opinion that it is unsustainable because in
Ghana, it is difficult to charge realistic rates for any project that is labelled “public or
government."
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Concluding remarks and reflections
This article has explored the urban dynamics and local impact of using Chinese government
concessional loans (CGCL) to finance urban regeneration. We have demonstrated that Chinese
infrastructural finance is no longer limited to national infrastructural projects across Africa, but is
increasingly being extended to municipal authorities to provide large-scale urban infrastructure. As
our findings show, irrespective of whether a CGCL is secured for a national or municipal project, it
is associated with similar political and embedded conditionalities. First, through infrastructural
financing, China is gaining growing support for its politically-motivated One-China
policy. Second, the Chinese government is strongly promoting its local firms, technology and
services through development assistance to municipal authorities in Africa (Brautigam, 2011;
Odoom, 2017). In the case of the Cape Coast loan, this was done by making it a condition of the
loan that Chinese construction firms and building materials be employed for the construction of the
temporary markets for traders’ relocation and subsequently for the new market. If the project finance
repayment model of the Cape Coast market project is anything to go by, China cannot be regarded
as absolutely scrambling for the natural resources of Africa, but should be seen as an important
development partner providing large-scale infrastructure finance for municipal authorities (Sun,
2014). However, we cannot overrate the fact that the bundling together of aid, trade and investment
in municipal financing in Africa repatriates a major chunk of the funding to China.
The shift in scale from the national to the local has critical implications. This study has shown that
local politicians, bureaucrats and urban development plans have now come under the discussion of
CGCL. Deeper involvement of local politicians in the negotiation process will not only change the power
dynamics between lender and borrower countries, but also drasticallymodify the results of the project on
the ground. Additionally, one could argue that the social sustainability of urban redevelopment projects
increases considerably with the engagement of local bureaucrats and politicians, while the economic
sustainability diminishes. We contend that focusing in our research on the urban scale enables a better
understanding of the political, social, economic and governance complexities and realities of using
Chinese infrastructure finance in Africa. Specifically, the scaling of the CGCL at the urban level implies
that the politicians and bureaucrats at the local level—much more so than the national representatives—
are confronted with the bigger dilemma of securing large-scale funding to provide infrastructure at low
rents. Consequently, although Africa—in our case more specifically Cape Coast, Ghana—gets to
redevelop its critical urban infrastructure, Chinese infrastructure finance may come with high financial
costs and crucial consequences for municipal (in)dependence.
Furthermore, this paper reveals crucial urban governance issues in Cape Coast, Ghana and Africa.
The strong presence of the traders in determining the rents in Kotokuraba Market shows how urban
residents are pushing the boundaries of democratization and compelling state actors to respond
positively to their activism. It is because local politicians reacted to the sophisticated pressure and
activism from the traders in the markets and on the streets that the economic hardship of foreseeable
unaffordable rent for the market spaces was avoided. Drawing on the notion of politics of scale, one
could argue that this commiseration of the local scale of governance could be strategically used by
national and municipal governments in the negotiation of CGCL. As Kevin Cox (1998, p. 20) argues,
“if there is some local branch of the state then it may be mobilized in order to protect some local
space of dependence.” Thus, the future provision of urban infrastructure in Africa, funded by CGCL,
could profit immensely if the local scale becomes an integral part of the negotiation system and
process. The state has a many branches. And to include urban actors where urban issues are involved
helps to more comfortably root urban regeneration projects in local needs.
Through our case study, some negative side effects of the CGCL became apparent. The fact
that the Cape Coast city had to base rents of a loan-funded project on guidelines prepared by the
central government supports the argument that municipal authorities do not have full control
over their finances. This may be the reason private investment in urban infrastructure is limited
in Ghana and Africa. The call on central government to repay the CGCL shows that municipal
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authorities in Africa have not outgrown the dependency syndrome (Kuusaana, 2015). In fact,
judging by the extremely low rents paid by traders in most Anglophone West African markets, it
is wishful thinking for any municipal government to expect that these traders would be willing
and able to pay high enough rents to enable them single-handedly to pay off a time-bound
Chinese loan. Perhaps, due to the fact that municipal borrowing in Ghana and many other
African countries is still in its infancy, what is required is not just central government assistance
to secure large-scale Chinese funding for municipal projects but, more importantly, multilevel
governance and strong collaboration between central and municipal governments (Gorelick, 2018;
UN-Habitat, 2015). A deliberate politics of scale (Cox, 1998), where the state uses its different
branches on the national and local level wisely in a well-orchestrated division of labor could help
minimize the negative effects of the CGCL.
It is also important to note that the Cape Coast case has implications for future urban develop-
ment. If Cape Coast is compelled to repay the loan, it may have to fall on its internally-generated
funds, implying that the city will be deprived of even the minor projects that it has been engaged in.
The consequences may be even more dire if Cape Coast is unable to repay the loan, as it stands to
lose not only Kotokuraba Market to the Chinese but also the opportunity to receive such large-scale
infrastructural financing from China. However, it may be in the interest of the Government of
Ghana to repay the loan on behalf of Cape Coast in order to attract future Chinese infrastructure
finance for Cape Coast and other municipal authorities in Ghana. Interestingly, this also has the
tendency to increase the country’s national debt stock. Ghana’s debt to GDP in 2016 was 73.4% and
has seen a slight improvement in 2017 to an estimated 69.2% (World Bank, 2018). Passing on the
CGCL to central government to repay might send Ghana back to a debt-to-GDP ratio of at least
70%. How the Cape Coast case concludes is likely to determine whether or not China would be
willing to provide additional large-scale infrastructure loans for municipal authorities in Ghana and
Africa.
In many developed countries, contracting or sub-contracting aspects of (re)development of urban
infrastructure is used to develop the capacity of local firms, who, in the process, gain the experience
for international assignments. The non-involvement of Design Associates by the Chinese construc-
tion firm in the development of Kotokuraba Market reveals the weakness of African municipal
governments in protecting local firms. Nevertheless, it should not be a deterrent to negotiating for
the inclusion of local firms in future infrastructural projects, because strong domestic institutions
and governance are fundamental to the use of Chinese infrastructural finance for urban projects
(Asongu & Aminkeng, 2013; Renard, 2011).
Our case study also highlights the potential challenge of repayment of Chinese infrastructure
finance in Africa, which has not yet become a topical issue because most loans are resource-backed.
While Chinese infrastructural finance may be vital for sustainable urban development in Africa in
the short to medium term, we suggest that municipal authorities should intensify their local revenue
generation, in the long term, to fund most of their large-scale urban infrastructure. Increasing local
revenues would require extensive exploitation of land resources and an overhaul of the property
taxation systems (Asiama, 2006; Boamah & Okrah, 2016; Peterson, 2006). Additionally, municipal
authorities must ensure high standards of transparency in revenue generation and expenditure
management (Owusu, 2014). If not, the heavy dependence on external borrowings coupled with
the prioritization of affordability over economic rates in loan-funded urban projects could plunge
African municipalities or countries into excessive debt or, worse still, cause them to lose strategic
public assets to lenders. But, as indicated by Obeng-Odoom (2010b), increasing revenue generation
at the municipal level does not guarantee that it will be expended judiciously in providing large-scale
urban infrastructure that benefits the majority of the local people. Therefore, we agree with Obeng-
Odoom (2010b) that pro-poor fiscal decentralization should involve a techno-democratic process in
which common people lead the process of determining local needs and play a significant role in
deciding how local revenues should be utilized to shape their future.
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Notes
1. We adopted a Bank of Ghana Daily Interbank Forex Rate, Friday, July 29, 2018, US$1 = GHȼ4.6924. This
applies to all subsequent cedi-dollar conversions.
2. Eventually the CCMA was able to construct Sector C from savings made from design modification.
3. This is used to determine the series of payments/deposits that are expected to be made at a future date. The
formula is PP ¼ PV  1 1þrð Þnr
h i
; where PP is periodic payment, PV is present value, r is the interest rate and
n is the term.
4. This may explain why both the bureaucrats and local politicians at CCMA were unwilling to provide the
feasibility report for analysis when it was requested by the researchers.
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